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Modern theories of government finance stress the importance of an economy=s fiscal deficits in determining the course 
of monetary policy.  Modern growth theory stresses the role of monetary factors in economic growth.  This paper explores 
how these two are interrelated, using a simple AK growth model, one with money, reserve requirements, and government 
debt.  We provide a comprehensive look at the coordination of macroeconomic policy and its effects on long-run growth 
under three alternative arrangements.  We uncover some unconventional results regarding the relationship between growth 
and a number of policy variables; these rest squarely on the constraint of the coordination process. - 1 - 
1 INTRODUCTION 
  It is widely recognized that a nation’s fiscal deficits can play a critical role in determining the course of 
monetary policy.  The government’s consolidated budget constraint links the policies of its two fiduciaries 
(the monetary and fiscal authorities), preventing them from pursuing policies that are strictly independent of 
one another. Sargent (1999) refers to the reconciling of this budget constraint as the coordination of 
monetary and fiscal policy; how this is achieved and what are some of the consequences of the coordination 
arrangement for long-run growth, inflation, and monetary policy is a central theme of this paper.    
Following the literature, we approach this problem assuming a dominant fiscal authority, one that sets an 
independent course for the nation’s fiscal deficits.  In the environment considered by Sargent and Wallace 
(1981) and others, the course of the money supply is then endogenous and the coordination of macro policy 
attains solely through changes in the inflation rate.  This description eloquently captures the essence of the 
coordination process.  It is, however, limited on at least two accounts: i) other macro variables, such as long-
run economic growth or real interest rates, do not adjust along with the inflation rate, and ii) no other 
instruments of monetary policy, such open market operations, the reserve requirement, or discount policy, 
are considered as alternative means of achieving coordination. 
  This paper addresses these two concerns within the context of a simple endogenous growth model with 
money, reserve requirements, and government debt.  Besides the process described above, which we refer to 
specifically as coordination-by-inflation, or more simply, an inflation-coordinating arrangement, we 
consider two alternative instruments of monetary policy that the central bank can use to achieve 
coordination. These include adjustments in the profile of government liabilities (an open-market 
coordinating arrangement) and changes in the required reserve ratio (a reserve requirement coordinating 
arrangement).
1  In all three cases, the growth rate adjusts simultaneously, along with the coordinating 
instrument, to satisfy market-clearing and the overall government budget constraint.  
Why are these two issues important?  Consider first the role of the growth rate in the coordination 
process.  Of concern is the size of the growth rate relative to the real return on government debt. This 
                                                 
1.  In our setting, a change in the required reserve ratio is equivalent to a change in the discount window when the 
monetary authority sets the nominal discount rate equal to zero. 
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determines whether long run, net debt issues provide positive real revenues for the government. Most, 
including Sargent and Wallace (1981), take both the growth rate and the real return as given, so either 
government debt provides sustainable revenues or it does not. It is in the latter case – which occurs when the 
growth rate is less than the return on debt – that the monetary and fiscal authorities cannot adopt long-run 
independent policies.  Yet, the very conditions on growth and returns which determine whether long-run 
coordination is necessary seem to be ones that should originate from the model, not imposed from outside. 
Further, in light of the considerable evidence of the growth effects of monetary policy, there is good reason 
to believe that whichever monetary instrument the central bank uses to achieve coordination, it will affect an 
economy’s growth rate (which in turn affects coordination).  Our model makes a modest attempt at exposing 
this simultaneity between growth, monetary policy, and coordination.
2    
  Growth and the real return on government debt also play an important role in determining how the 
coordinating instrument must change in response to an exogenous change in fiscal or monetary policy. 
Sargent and Wallace’s ‘unpleasant monetarist arithmetic’ (tight money increases the inflation rate) provides a 
nice illustration. In their framework, an open market sale or increase in the debt-to-money ratio produces 
unpleasant monetarist arithmetic, provided the growth rate is less than the real return on debt.  An increase in 
government debt, however, will likely impact negatively on growth in an endogenous growth model, simply 
by crowding out private capital.  If so, unpleasant arithmetic may emerge even when the growth rate is 
greater than the return on debt. Lower growth may reduce net revenues from debt issues, forcing the 
monetary authority to raise the inflation tax in order to satisfy the government’s budget.  We devote part of 
our study of inflation coordination to the impact of open market operations on long-run growth and inflation, 
and we provide an example of this type of high-growth unpleasant monetarist arithmetic.  Our model, of 
course, also displays other, more conventional arithmetics, similar to Espinosa-Vega and Russell (2001).   
  Our study also provides a comprehensive look at alternative ways by which the monetary authority can 
achieve coordination.  As far as we know, ours is the only study examining these within the context of a 
                                                 
2.  Our approach can be compared with Bhattacharaya et al (1997) and Espinosa-Vega and Russell (1998).  Both studies 
allow long-run inflation and real returns to adjust in the coordination process. Espinosa-Vega and Russell (2001), 
Bhattacharaya and Kudoh (2002), and Nikitin and Russell (2003) consider long-run changes in the capital stock, but 
changes to the growth rate play no role in the long-run coordination process since steady state growth equals zero. 
Espinosa-Vega and Yip (1999) provide a model of an inflation-coordination arrangement and long-run economic 
growth with no government debt.  - 3 - 
model with long-run growth.
3 Besides offering insight into the possible implications for policy that these 
alternatives offer, we are drawn to their study by the fact that many central banks have opted recently for 
greater autonomy, especially when setting money growth rates.  Policies such as targeting the aggregate price 
level, or the inflation rate, seem to fly in the face of coordination-by-inflation.  Reflecting on how these 
targeting policies square with policy coordination, one can simply supplant the assumption of a dominant 
fiscal authority for a dominant monetary one, though there is scant hard evidence to suggest governments 
have found ways to curb substantially their long-run fiscal appetites.  On the other hand, even in a world with 
a dominant fiscal authority, money growth can be independent of fiscal policy – though overall monetary 
policy cannot.  Using its other instruments for coordination, the monetary authority can achieve some degree 
of independence in setting its long-run inflationary goals.  Our study of these alternative arrangements 
underscores this point, as well as the fact that a central bank’s inflation target may not be entirely free or 
independent of the fiscal constraint.  The alternatives to inflation coordination provide some monetary 
independence, but an overly ambitious inflationary target is incompatible with an equilibrium.     
  Our model provides some interesting comparative static results, two of which we spotlight here in this 
introduction. First, since both growth and inflation are determined endogenously under our inflation 
coordinating arrangement, our study can provide some insight into the sort of inflation-growth correlations 
one might observe in a cross section of economies.  Varying government deficits, the reserve requirement, or 
the bond-money ratio – all exogenous determinants of a nation’s inflation policy under this coordinating 
process – suggest a mix of both positive and negative inflation-growth correlations, not unlike the mixed 
observations on inflation and growth in the data.  Second, while some of our results are straightforward, a 
few buck conventional wisdom.  For example, an increase in the reserve requirement under an open market 
coordinating arrangement can increase long-run growth, counter to the notion that a higher reserve 
requirement is financially repressive and retards growth. The anomaly rests squarely on the type of monetary 
instrument we assume adjusts to achieve coordination and that the higher reserve requirement leads to a 
concomitant change in the coordinating instrument that enhances growth.  The anomaly of an open market 
                                                 
3 Bhattacharya and Haslag (2003), Bhattacharya and Kudoh (2002), and Espinosa-Vega and Russell (2001) explore 
different aspects of these alternatives in models with no long-run growth. Espinosa-Vega and Yip (1999) compare a tax 
coordination arrangement with an inflation arrangement in a long-run growth model with no government debt. 
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sale associated with Sargent and Wallace’s unpleasant monetarist arithmetic is rooted in the same principle – 
it is not so much the change in the policy itself that matters, as it is the change it evokes in the coordinating 
instrument.  This is precisely why it is important to understand the coordinating process. 
  The rest of paper proceeds as follows.  In Section 2, we discuss the general structure of the model.  This 
includes a description of the decisions of households, firms, and intermediaries, the government=s budget 
constraint, and the market-clearing conditions of the model. The next three sections provide a comprehensive 
look at each coordinating process, starting with an inflation-coordinating arrangement.  In each, we lay out 
the conditions for the existence of equilibrium and provide some comparative static results.  Section 6 
provides a short comparison of these arrangements.  Concluding remarks are contained in Section 7. 
2 THE  MODEL 
Agents 
  Time is discrete and at each date t ,  1 t ≥ , a continuum (measure 1) of two-period lived agents is born.  
Agents of each generation are identical. Each is endowed with 1 unit of time when young, which is supplied 
inelastically to a competitive firm that produces the consumption good at each date using inputs of labor and 
capital.   A portion of the agent=s wage earnings, t w  finances consumption in the current period, the rest is 
saved for future consumption. All saving is in the form of an intermediated bank deposit.  At  1 t = , the old 
are endowed collectively with  0 M , 0 B , and  0 K  (cash, government debt, and capital, respectively).  
Formally, a representative agent h born at date  1 t ≥  saves  t
h
t w s s =  and consumes  t
h
t w s 1 c ) ( − =  in 
the current period, where  1    <      s <    0  is the saving rate.
 4  Letting  t r  denote the gross return on intermediated 




t s r x =  at date  1 t + . Aggregate saving, t S , equals  t Y 1 s ) ( α − , where 
α    -    1  is labor’s share of output and  t Y  is date t  GNP.   
Firms 
Firms hire young workers and rent capital from the intermediary.  Factor markets are competitive and 
each factor is paid its marginal product.  Growth is introduced by assuming a simple Romer-type model of 
                                                 
4.  A constant saving rate is consistent with a model where agents have log-linear utility lnct
h + β  lnxt
h, where 0 < β < 1 . 
In this case, s = β  /(1+β ).   - 5 - 
capital externality; at the firm level, output is given by 









t N K K A Y ) ( ) (  , where  t K  is the 
economy-wide average capital stock available at date t .  Aggregate output is given by  t t K A Y = .  For 
simplicity, we assume capital depreciates fully each period. 
Factor prices each period are  t t Y 1 w ) ( α − =  and  A qt α = , where  t q  is the rental price of capital.   
Intermediaries 
Intermediaries act as a go-between for agents and firms, accepting deposits from young agents and 
renting capital to firms.  Each faces a reserve requirement, 1 0 < < λ λ , , which forces them to hold a 
minimum fraction of the deposits in the form of cash.  When binding, the competitive return on deposits is 
t t m t q 1 r r ) ( ; λ λ − + = , where  1 t t t m P P r + ≡ / ;  is the real return on money (the inverse of gross inflation).
5 
Government 
  Two branches (a fiscal and a monetary authority) represent the government of this economy.  The fiscal 
authority sets sequences for taxes, government spending, and issues nominal government debt. Denote the 
primary deficit as  t G , which we assume is a constant fraction of real GNP;  t t Y g G = , where 1 g 0 < < .  The 
amount of nominal bonds or debt at t  is  t t B B P ; , where  t B  is the number of bonds and  t B P ; ,  1 P 0 t B < < ; , is 
the nominal bond price.  These bonds pay off at par at date  1   +   t . To keep things simple, we assume 
government debt is subject to the same intermediation process as private capital – that is, we treat debt and 
capital as perfect substitutes, and each pays the same real return.
6  
The monetary authority sets the path of the money supply{} t M  and the reserve requirementλ .  It also 
manages the profile of the government’s liabilities, through open market operations.  These, together with 
fiscal policy, must satisfy the consolidated budget constraint of the government at each date, 
                                                 
5.  Our treatment of intermediaries and reserve requirements is similar to Wallace (1984), Bhattacharya et al (1998), 
Bhattacharya and Haslag (2003), and Espinosa-Vega and Russell (2001).  Alternatively, reserves can be determined 
endogenously. (See Schreft and Smith (1998), Bhattacharya et al (1997), or Espinosa-Vega and Yip (1999,2000)). 
6.  Wallace (1984) and McCandless (1995) make similar assumptions.  Alternatively, one can assume government debt 
is not subject to intermediation, as in Bhattacharya et al (1998). There also may be a different (non-zero) reserve 
requirement for government debt.  The assumption that debt and capital are intermediated in the same manner makes the 
model easier to present, but it does not change fundamentally many of the results.  As an example, see Footnote 20.  
 
















;            ( 1 )  
for  ... , , 2 1 t = ,with  0 M 0 >  and  0 B0 >  given.       
Market-Clearing 
At each date, two markets must clear – the money market and the rental capital/bond market (the factor 
prices already incorporate clearing for the labor market).  The clearing conditions for these markets are   









1 t t P
B P
K Y 1 1 s
; + = − − + α λ .          ( 3 )  
  An equilibrium is a sequence for prices, interest rates, allocations of goods, capital, debt, and money and 
the coordinating instrument (money growth, reserve requirement, or debt-money ratio) such that: 
■  the allocations are optimal for agents and firms when faced with those interest rates and prices; 
■  the allocations satisfy the market-clearing conditions; 
■  the government budget constraint is satisfied at each date. 
    
A balanced growth (or stationary) equilibrium is an equilibrium with a constant growth rate for output, 
capital, consumption, and is characterized by constant consumption-to-output ratios, capital-to-output ratios, 
and constant real returns to money and capital at each date. 
Our strategy for establishing the existence of a balanced growth equilibrium in Sections 3-5 involves 
distilling two curves from the government budget constraint (1) and the clearing conditions (2), (3). These 
describe the relationship between growth and the coordinating instrument for the arrangement at hand, and 
determine jointly the (stationary) equilibrium values of the growth rate and coordinating instrument. We then 
use these curves in some comparative static exercises.  Section 3 (coordination-by-inflation) contains the 
bulk of the discussion behind our procedure, though it readily extends to the other two coordinating 
arrangements discussed in Sections 4 and 5. 
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3  AN INFLATION-COORDINATING ARRANGEMENT 
This section establishes the existence of a balanced growth equilibrium assuming the money growth rate 
adjusts to ensure the government’s budget constraint holds for each date.  We also provide a characterization 
of the equilibrium and explore some of the comparative static properties of this arrangement.  
3.1 Equilibrium 
Capital/bond market-clearing 
Begin by rewriting the capital/bond clearing condition in terms of the return on money  m r , the (gross) 
growth rate  t 1 t t Y Y / + ≡ γ , and bond-money ratio  t t M B , which in this section we assume is constant and 
equal to θ  for  1.       t ≥
7 This assumption plays an integral role in our depiction of the inflation-growth 
relationship described below.  
Since bonds and capital are perfect substitutes, government debt displays a standard ‘Fisherian’ property. 
Its nominal return, t B P 1 ; , is an inflation-adjusted markup of the real return,  A α :  t 1 t t B P P A P 1 / / ; + =α .  
Using this, along with (2) and the policy parameter θ , write (3) as           













+ = − −
+
+ .         ( 4 )  





   -    1      s   
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.       (5) 
In (5), we use the fact  1 t 1 t K A Y + + =  and t 1 t t Y Y / + ≡ γ .  
Rearranging (5), we can express growth as a decreasing, linear function of the real gross return on 
money,  t m r ;  – our first of two curves describing the inflation-growth relationship:  
( ) () () ( ) α λ θ α λ α γ t m t m a r A 1 1 s r ; ; − − − = .         (6) 
  
                                                 
7.  We interpret a change in θ   under an inflation-coordinating arrangement as a once-and-for-all open market operation.  
Our approach here is consistent with Wallace (1984), McCandless (1995), and Espinosa-Vega and Russell (1998).  
Others interpret an open market operation as a once-and-for-all change in the ratio of the market value of debt to money, 
PB;t Bt /Mt rather than its face value  Bt /Mt  (see, for example, Bhattacharya et al (1998) or Schreft and Smith (1998)). 
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  A higher inflation rate, all else the same, increases the nominal interest rate (bond prices fall).  Given the 
ratio of bonds to money,θ , the real value of government debt issues declines, so a larger portion of saving is 
allocated to productive capital.  This gives rise to the positive growth-inflation relationship found in (6).   
Government budget constraint and money-market clearing 
Turning to the government=s budget constraint, replace the lagged real balance term in (1) with 
() 1 t 1 t m Y 1 s r − − − α λ ; , since  () 1 t 1 t m 1 t 1 t 1 t m t 1 t Y 1 s r P M r P M − − − − − − − = = α λ ; ;  for  2 t ≥ , from (2).  Similarly, 
lagged debt outstanding at date t , t 1 t P B − , is () () ()( ) 1 t m 1 t t 1 t 1 t 1 t 1 t 1 t r Y    -    1    s   P P P M M B − − − − − − − = ; α λ θ . 
Current debt issues are  () () ( ) () t t m t t t t t B t t t B Y 1 s A r P M M B P P B P α λ θ α − = = ; ; ; . Rewriting (1),  
() () () () 1 t 1 t m t t m 1 t 1 t m t t Y s 1 r A Y s 1 r Y s 1 r Y s 1 G − − − − − − − + − − − = α λ θ α α λ θ α λ α λ ; ; ; , for  2       t ≥ . 
     () () 1 0 1 1 m 1 0 1 1 P B A Y s 1 r P M Y s 1 G − − + − − = α α λ θ α λ ; , for  1    =    t . 
Since our point of focus is a stationary equilibrium, we set  m t m 1 t m r r r = = − ; ;  in the constraints above. 
Substituting t Y g  for t G  and arranging terms, we have 
  () [] () ( ) [] γ α θ α λ α γ α λ A 1 1 s A r r 1 1 s g m m − − + − − = ,         ( 7 )  
for  2       t ≥ , whereγ is the balanced growth rate.  This gives us our second expression describing the growth 
rate as a function of the real return on money, 
  () () ()
() () [] g A r 1 A 1 s




m b α θ α λ α α λ
θ α α λ
γ
− − + −
+ −
= .          ( 8 )  
At date 1,   
() () 1 1 0 m 1 1 0 Y P B A 1 s r Y P M 1 s g − − + − − = α θ α λ α λ ,         ( 9 )  
where  0 M ,  0 B  are given, and  1 1 K A Y =  is given, since the initial capital stock,  1 K , is given. 
From (7), we identify two potential sources of government revenue under this arrangement – money 
seignorage,  () [] γ α λ m r 1 1 s ms − − ≡ , and bond seignorage,  () ( ) [] γ α θ α λ α A 1 1 s A r bs m − − ≡ .  Money 
seignorage is non-negative in any monetary equilibrium, and, since the saving rate is constant, an increase in - 9 - 
the inflation rate (a decrease in  m r ) increases money seignorage revenues.
8  Depending on the growth rate 
and the return on debt, net revenues from bond issues can be positive or negative. Without sufficient growth, 
revenues from new bond issues are not enough to offset the real service of past debt. 
With Assumption 1 below,  () m b r γ  describes a negative relationship between growth and inflation. This 
relationship stems from that fact that a marginal increase in  m r  changes total seignorage,  bs ms + , by 
() () [] γ θ α θ α λ + − − 1 A 1 s , which is negative, since the growth rate under this arrangement is less than 
() θ θ α + 1 A .
9  To compensate for the reduction in revenues, the growth rate must increase in order to satisfy 
the budget constraint (7) (note money and bond seignorage both are increasing functions of the growth rate).  
Existence of Equilibrium 
Our strategy for establishing the existence of an equilibrium is as follows.  First, we show we can find a 
m r ,  m r 0 <  which satisfies  () () m b m a r r γ γ = .  This establishes a growth rate and return on money that satisfy 
market-clearing and the government=s budget constraint for all dates  2 t ≥ . Using (9), we then find the initial 
price level  1 P  that satisfies market clearing and the government budget constraint for date 1.  The initial 
price level depends on (given) values for the initial stocks of money and debt outstanding, ( 0 M and  0 B  
respectively), output  1 Y  (also given), and on  m r .  
We focus on binding equilibria; by this we mean equilibria in which the reserve requirement is binding 
at each date, or, equivalently, the price of rental capital, t q , is at least as great as the return on money, m r . 
Assumption 1 and 2 below ensure a binding equilibrium exists. 
    
Assumption 1.  () () [] 0 1 1 1 s > − + − + θ λ α α . 
Assumption 2.  () g 1 s > − α λ . 
 
                                                 
8.  The economy does not display an inflation-tax Laffer curve, in part because the monetary tax base is a constant 
function of the return on money rm.  Two values for rm satisfy γ a(rm) = γ b(rm); given Assumptions 1 and 2, only one is 
positive.       
9.  The fact the growth rate is less than αΑ (1+ θ)  /θ  comes directly from (8); simple calculus shows (8) is increasing in 
rm, and the limit of the right-hand side of (8) as rm goes to infinity is αΑ (1+ θ)  /θ  . - 10 - 
Assumption 2 restricts the primary government deficit to be less than the monetary seignorage tax base, 
ensuring there exists an inflation tax that can finance the deficit.  Wallace (1984) makes a similar 
assumption.  With it,  () m b r γ  is increasing and concave over () ∞ , 0 , with () 0 0 b = γ . Assumption 1 ensures 
bindingness.
10 An appendix detailing the significance of this assumption and containing the mathematical 
derivations of most of the results of the paper is available upon request.  
  A pivotal issue in the literature on unpleasant monetarist arithmetic and the effect of an open market 
operation on inflation turns on whether the growth rate in the economy is greater than or less than the real 
return on government debt. Our first result establishes the existence of equilibrium under an inflation-
coordinating arrangement and characterizes the equilibrium growth rate relative to  A α , the return on debt. 
Result 1. Characterizing equilibrium growth under an inflation-coordinating arrangement.  
A.  Suppose () () A A s 1 1 α α λ < − − .  An equilibrium exists with a balanced growth rate less than  A α .   
B.  Suppose () () A A s 1 1 α α λ > − − .   
   i)  If  () () [] g 1 1 s 1 θ θ λ α α > − + − + , an equilibrium exists and the growth rate is less than  A α .   
  ii)  If  () () [] g 1 1 s 1 θ θ λ α α < − + − + , an equilibrium exists and the growth rate is greater than  A α .   
3.2 Comparative Statics 
The triplet() λ θ , , g  defines a country’s inflation policy under this coordinating arrangement.  A change 
in any component of the policy triplet changes the equilibrium growth and inflation rates.  Below, we 
summarize how the steady-state changes for marginal changes in the two monetary policy parameters θ  and 
λ .  Since the primary deficit  g  is a parameter common to the triplets of all three coordinating arrangements, 
we defer until Section 6 our discussion of the effects of an increase in  g  on each arrangement.  Section 6 
also contains a table summarizing all the comparative static results of the model. 
Result 2. Effect of an open market sale on growth and inflation.  A permanent increase in the ratio of 
bonds-to-money,θ  (a permanent, tighter monetary policy) has a negative effect on the equilibrium growth 
rate and an ambiguous effect on the inflation rate. 
                                                 
10. Assumption 1 is sufficient for bindingness; one can easily produce examples of binding equilibria where 
Assumption 1 does not hold.  - 11 - 
This result admits two possible outcomes, due to the fact both γ  curves shift with an increase in θ .  We 
provide more definitive predictions for inflation by considering each of the following in turn. 
Case A.  >Low-Growth= Cases.  Tighter money increases the inflation rate and reduces the growth rate. 
>Low-growth= refers to equilibria with a growth rate less than the real return,  A α ; it is the case 
considered by Sargent and Wallace (1981).  Results 1A and 1B state conditions which support such 
equilibria.  In each case, bond seignorage,  () [] [] γ α α θ α λ A 1 A 1 s rm − − , in equilibrium, is negative.  All 
else the same, a marginal increase in the bond-to-money ratio θ  increases the net debt service of the 
government.  A higher θ  also reduces the growth rate by (directly) crowding out private capital in the rental 
capital/government debt market.  This has a secondary, reinforcing negative effect on both the seignorages.  
To compensate, the return on money must fall (the inflation rate increases) in order to satisfy the government 
budget constraint.  Although a higher inflation rate reduces the price of new debt issues, and by consequence, 
has a positive effect on growth, a higher θ  will not increase growth in this economy.  (See Figures 1A, 1B).   
Case B.  >High-Growth= Cases.  Tighter money has an ambiguous effect on the equilibrium inflation rate 
and reduces the growth rate. 
Under a high-growth case ( A α γ > ), bond seignorage is positive. By itself, a marginal increase in θ   
increases the amount of revenue collected by the government.  However, the increase in θ  also crowds out 
some private capital, as described above for the low growth cases. Whether tighter money decreases or 
increases the equilibrium inflation rate depends critically on whether the positive impact of a higher θ  on 
bond seignorage is larger or smaller than the negative effect of lower growth on the amount of bond and 
money seignorage collected.  (See Figure 1C).  
To illustration a case of unpleasant monetarist arithmetic with ‘high growth’ let 
04 . , 0075 . g , 475 . s , 45 . 3 A , 3 . = = = = = λ α  and  2 = θ .  Raising θ  to  5 . 2 = θ  increases the net inflation rate 
from 106.87% to113.53%.  The net, equilibrium growth rate, for the lower and higher value of θ  is 5.84% 
and 4.88% respectively; both are greater than the net real yield on government debt, 3.5% . 
- Insert Figure 1 - 
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Despite the possibility that a tighter monetary policy leads to higher inflation, the model exhibits the 
conventional result that a tighter monetary policy reduces the initial price level.  From (9), 
() ( ) ( ) () g s 1 r s 1 Y B M P m 1 0 0 1 − − + − + = α λ θ α λ , where  m r  satisfies  () () m b m a r r γ γ = . It is easy to show 
() 1 d r d r m m − > θ θ , so  () s 1 rm α λ θ −  increases with an increase in θ  and the price level is lower. 
Result 3.  Effect of a change in the reserve requirement on growth and inflation.  A permanent increase in 
the reserve requirementλ  reduces the balanced growth rate and has an ambiguous effect on the inflation rate.  
We can describe the effect of a change in the reserve requirement parameter λ  on the equilibrium 
growth and inflation rates in much the same terms as an open market operation. Unlike an open market 
operation, however, the initial or direct effect of an increase in λ  increases the seignorage sum,  bs ms + , 
regardless of whether  A α γ <
> .
11  The increase in λ  has two direct effects on the rental capital/debt market; 
both reduce growth.  First, an increase in the reserve requirement forces the intermediary to hold more cash 
on reserve, so fewer resources are available to the market.  Second, the real value of new government debt 
issues, t t t B P B P ; , increases, since, for a given bond-to-money ratio θ ,  ()A Y 1 s r P B P t m t t t B α α λ θ − = ; . 
As in open market sale, the negative effect on the sum,  bs ms + , of a decrease in the growth rate may or may 
not outweigh the direct effect of λ  on this sum.  If the secondary growth effect does outweigh the direct 
effect, the inflation rate must rise ( m r  falls) to satisfy the government budget constraint.  Otherwise, a higher 
λ  reduces the equilibrium inflation rate.  The result is analogous to the two cases described in Figure 1C. 
We close with some observations regarding possible inflation-growth diagrams that might emerge in a 
world consisting of economies with differing components for seignorage policy ( , ,θ g orλ ), but are 
otherwise identical.  These illustrate the impact the policy has on the inflation-coordinating arrangement. 
Figure 2A shows a hypothetical inflation-growth cross-sectional diagram for a world comprised of similar 
economies, differing only as regards the ratio of bond-to-money, θ .  Figures 2B and 2C show similar 
diagrams, the differences across economies being the reserve requirementλ , and fraction of government 
                                                 
11.  From the definition of ms and bs and the government budget constraint, it is easy to see that the direct effect of an 
increase in λ   on the sum ms + bs equals g/λ.  - 13 - 
spending to GNP, respectively.
 12  
Much of what we glean from these diagrams follows directly from the comparative statics.  Figure 2A 
suggests a clear negative relation between inflation and growth, while Figure 2C suggests these variables are 
positively related.
13  Depending on the portion of the diagram one focuses on, Figure 2B shows a negative 
and positive relationship between the two.  Collectively, these diagrams underscore the importance of 
understanding macro-policy coordination and the role it plays in the relationship between inflation and 
growth. Clearly, this relationship depends very much on the policy measures driving the difference in these 
variables across economies.
14 This point seems applicable, in light of the mixed empirical observations on 
inflation and growth in the data. (See, for example, McCandless and Weber (1995)). 
-Insert Figure 2- 
4 AN  OPEN-MARKET  COORDINATING ARRANGEMENT  
In this section and the next, we examine two alternative coordinating arrangements at the disposal of a 
central bank.  Under certain circumstances, these allow the bank to pursue the disparate goals of coordinating 
and inflation targeting – that is, under these arrangements, the inflation rate is an exogenous policy 
parameter.
15  Since the inflation target, among other factors, affects the coordinating process, a considerable 
part of our discussion is devoted to describing the comparative statics of a change in the inflation rate. 
This section considers the bond-money ratio θ  as a coordinating instrument. Here, the central bank sets 
the monetary growth rate (equivalently, the long-run inflation rate) and the reserve requirement, and the 
bond-money ratio θ  adjusts, along with the economy=s growth rate, so as to satisfy the market-clearing 
conditions and the government=s budget constraint each period.  
                                                 
12.  The diagrams in Figure 2 are illustrative examples, not calibrations of actual economies.  We assume α  = .27, A = 
3.85, s = .44; this yields a rental price of capital/return on government debt of 1.0395, or 3.95%.  These values were 
selected, in part, because they support equilibria for a large variation in the policy parameters g, θ , and λ .  In Figure 2A, 
we set g = .025 and λ  = .10, and vary θ  from θ  = .60 to θ  = 6.  We assume g = .025 and θ  =4, and vary λ   from λ  = .08 
to λ  = .26 in Figure 2B.  In Figure 2C, we set λ  =.10 and θ  = 4, and vary g from g = .003 to g = .03. 
13.  The diagram for variations in the open market operation parameter, θ   can, theoretically, look like that of Figure 
2B; for this parameterization of the model, however, it displays a distinct negative inflation-growth relationship.   
14.  The possibility that countries may operate under different coordinating arrangements compounds this problem. 
15.  In this model, inflation targeting is equivalent to targeting the nominal interest rate, since the real return is constant.  - 14 - 
Throughout the section, we compare the central bank’s target policy against a benchmarked inflation 
policy
o
m r 1 , one where bond seignorage equals zero for all  0 > θ . When the bank’s target is lower than 
o
m r 1  
(
o
m m r r > ), bond seignorage is always positive. An analogous argument holds for 
o
m m r r < . 
4.1 Equilibrium  
Let  () [] () α λ α α λ − − − ≡ 1 s A g s 1 r
o
m .  We characterize the inflation policy as a simple function of 
o
m r , 
o
m m r r σ =  , with  1 <
> σ .




m m r r σ = , the counterpart to (6) for this coordinating arrangement is  
   () ( ) ( ) () []   g 1 1 1 s A   =     a θ σ σ θ λ α θ γ + + − − ,          ( 1 0 )  
which is decreasing and linear in θ , by Assumption 1.  The intuition behind (10) is clear. Given a constant 
inflation rate, the nominal price of new debt issues is constant. A higher θ  then represents a larger real debt 
obligation of the government, crowding out private capital and reducing the growth rate.  
Government budget constraint and money-market clearing 
The counterpart to eq.(8) is given by 
() ( )( ) θ σ θ α σ θ γ + + = 1 1 A b ,           ( 1 1 )  
which is decreasing and convex if  1    >    σ , concave and increasing if  1    <    σ , and a constant function of θ  if 
1    =    σ .  Regardless of the size of σ ,  () A    =   Lim b α θ γ
θ ∞ →
. 
The intuition behind the b γ  curve (11) and its relationship with the inflation target is straightforward.  By 
construction, bond seignorage is zero under the target 
o
m r 1 . Since  () ( ) [] γ α θ α λ α A 1 1 s A r bs m − − ≡ , 
growth must equal the real return  A α  for all  0 > θ  when the target equals 
o
m r 1 , and the government’s 
deficit is financed solely by money seignorage, ms.   A target set lower than 
o
m r 1  (
o
m m r r >  or  1 > σ ),  
                                                 
16.  There is no loss in generality in using σ  rm 
o to characterize the targeted return rm when establishing the existence of 
an equilibrium. It is, however, of limited use in comparative statics, since σ   rm
o varies with λ  and g.  The condition for 
bindingness, rm < α A, implies, σ   < α A/ rm
o.  We assume this inequality holds throughout the discussion above. - 15 - 
reduces money seignorage for all  0 ≥ θ .  In turn, this implies bond seignorage under the lower target is 
positive for each  0 > θ  in order for bs ms g + = , as required by the government’s budget constraint (7).  A 
higher  θ  increases the bond seignorage tax base; given the government’s revenue needs, g , the bond 
seignorage tax,() γ α A 1−  must fall, i.e., the growth rate falls.  The opposite occurs when 
o
m m r 1 r 1 > . 
Under this coordinating arrangement, the initial price, () ( ) ( ) () [] g s 1 A 1 Y B M P 1 0 0 1 − − + + = α λ θ α σ , 
is positive, provided Assumption 1 holds.  
Existence of Equilibrium 
Let  () () α λ α σ − − ≡ 1 1 s







* σ σ <
> .  Below, we use σ  (policy) 
and 
* σ (benchmark) to characterize the equilibrium growth paths. 
Result 4.  Characterizing Equilibria (Open-Market Coordinating Arrangement). 
A.  If  1 < <σ σ
* , an equilibrium does not exist. 
B.  If  1 < σ  and 
* σ σ < , an equilibrium exists, it is unique, and the growth rate is less than  A α . 
C.  If 
* σ σ < < 1 , an equilibrium exists and it is unique.  The equilibrium growth rate is greater than  A α . 
D. If  1   >   σ  and 
* σ σ   >   , coordination, if possible, admits two possible equilibria.  In each case, the 
growth rate is greater than  A α .  
Figure 3 illustrates the four possibilities described above.  
- Insert Figure 3- 
The intuition behind Result 4 is as follows.  The effective inflation tax is () γ m r    -    1   .  If the condition of 
4A prevails, the growth rate is never high enough to support coordination.  The conditions of 4B and 4C 
permit a growth rate high enough to allow coordination.  In 4B,  m r  is low enough (inflation target is high 
enough) that all revenues can be raised via money seignorage; bond seignorage is negative due to the fact the 
only  θ  that achieves coordination is one that leaves the equilibrium growth rate less than  A α .  In other 
words, the amount of monetary seignorage revenues raised when  A α γ = ,  () () . g A r 1 1 s m > − − α α λ   Any 
0 > θ  that leaves  A α γ >  produces even more monetary seignorage and positive bond seignorage, which is - 16 - 
incompatible  with the budget requirement  bs ms g + = . The opposite is true in 4C.  Together, these suggest 
that if  1 >
* σ , all generations, aside from the initial old, benefit if the central bank adopts a lower inflation 
target (or, in other words, moves from 4B to 4C), as it permits higher growth and a higher effective return.
17 
4D reflects a Laffer curve relation for this economy, one that applies directly to bond, as oppose to 
monetary, seignorage.  Here, the inflation rate is sufficiently low so that a portion of revenues must be raised 
through bond seignorage, () ( ) [] γ α θ α λ α A 1 1 s A rm − − .  This can be raised in two ways: i) levy a ‘high’ 
effective tax – one with a higher growth rate and ‘low’ base (as measured by a low θ ), or ii) a ‘low’ tax 
(lower growth, high θ  configuration). Note the proportion of money seignorage to total seignorage is higher 
under i), since the money tax  () γ m r    -    1    is increasing inγ . 
Result 4 also reveals limits to the coordination process, suggesting the budgetary needs of the 
government place some constraints on the central bank=s inflation target.  4A and D indicate the bank cannot 
be too ambiguous in targeting inflation without adjusting the other monetary instrument, the reserve 
requirementλ .  How limited is the target? That’s an open question. Obviously, the bank cannot be 
completely independent in setting  m r 1 – a target that sets  γ = m r , for example, raises no money seignorage, 
which is incompatible with an equilibrium. 
4.2 Comparative Statics 
  Simple differentiation of (10) shows  a γ  is decreasing in the target σ . Similarly b γ  of (11) is increasing 
inσ .  These lead to our first comparative static result for this arrangement.        
Result 5.  The effects of inflation targeting under an open-market coordinating arrangement. 
 A.  If the conditions of cases 4B or 4C hold, a lower inflation target  m r 1  increases the growth rate and 
decreases the equilibrium coordinating bond-money ratio. 
B.  If the conditions of case 4D hold and an equilibrium exists, a lower inflation target lowers the higher 
equilibrium growth rate and raises θ , and raises the lower equilibrium growth rate and reduces the ratioθ . 
                                                 
17.  The old benefit from a higher σ  as well, in the form of a lower initial price P1, but P1 is also affected by the 
accompanying change in θ . - 17 - 
As noted, a lower  m r 1 reduces the total amount of seignorage collected. If bond seignorage is positive, 
(4C and D) an increase in the bond-money ratio θ  can possibly offset the decline in revenues, though this 
has the effect of decreasing the growth rate, which effectively lowers the tax rate on money and on 
government debt.  Alternatively, raising the tax rate on both seignorages – through an increase in growth – 
can always compensate for the decline in revenues resulting from a lower inflation target.  This increase in 
the growth is accomplished through a lower θ  – that is, the government relies relatively more on money 
versus bond seignorage.  If bond seignorage is negative (4B), a lower θ  increases growth (compensating in 
part for the direct impact the lower target has on total revenues) as well as reduce the government’s overall 
financial burden by reducing the total amount it pays in net interest payments on debt.   
  We close with an example involving the effect of a higher reserve requirement under this arrangement.  
Result 6.  An increase in the reserve requirement and its effect on growth.  A higher reserve requirement 
may increase the long-run growth rate under an open-market coordinating arrangement. 
We highlight this result as it runs counter to the notion an increase in the reserve requirement is 
financially repressive and reduces long-run growth.  This is, in fact, the conclusion reached in Result 3. The 
notion is generally correct, though it fails to recognize that an exogenous change in reserve policy can invoke 
other changes, as part of the coordination process, which may be growth-enhancing.  In this case, 
specifically, the bond-money ratio θ  falls.  As noted in the Introduction, the anomaly is grounded in the 
same principle as unpleasant monetarist arithmetic. Here=s an example: let  .05; =   .475;   =     s .0075; =   g λ  
3.85   =   A   .27;   =     .85;   =   rm α . The economy supports two equilibria (4D).  Growth in the steady-state with 
higher growth is 19.3%, and the bond-money ratio is 1.38.  Increasing λ  to .06 raises the growth rate to 
22.7%, and θ  falls to .426.  Of course, growth in the other steady-state decreases with the increase in λ . 
 
5  A RESEVE REQUIRMENT COORDINATING ARRANGEMENT  
As an alternative to the two arrangements described above, the central bank can use the reserve 
requirement λ  as a coordinating instrument of macro policy.  As in Sections 3 and 4, we use (5), (2), and (7) 
to derive the appropriate a γ and b γ curves which summarize the relationship between growth and λ  for this - 18 - 
coordinating arrangement. This is similar to the steps in Section 3 and is not repeated here.  
For this section, we replace Assumption 2 with:  
Assumption 3  () ( ) [] m r A 1 s g A     θ α α α λ λ + − ≡ >
−
 . 
Assumption 3 ensures the initial price level, as well as the growth rate, are positive whenever the real rate of 
return, A α , is greater than 1.  Any λ  that satisfies Assumption 2 satisfies Assumption 3. Additionally, any 
0 > λ  with  () () 0 b a > = λ γ λ γ  will be larger than
−
λ  , since  0 b < γ  for 
−




It is simple enough to show () λ γ a , the counterpart to (6) and (10), is decreasing and linear in the reserve 
requirement. A higherλ  reduces the amount of intermediated saving channeled to the capital/bond market as 
well as increases the real value of government debt, by lowering the price level t P .  Both reduce growth.  
Government budget constraint and money-market clearing 
  Given Assumption 3, the function summarizing the government budget constraint and money market-
clearing, () λ γ b , is decreasing and convex inλ .  All else the same, a marginal increase in λ  increases 
revenues  bs ms +  by () () ( ) () λ α γ α θ α γ α g A A 1 1 s r 1 1 s m = − − + − − . Lowering the growth rate reduces 
these revenues in accord with the government budget constraint (7).   
Existence of Equilibrium  
Define the ancillary reserve requirement,  () ( ) ( ) [] m m r A 1 s g A r − − ≡ α α α λ
*  and target, 
() [] () [] α θ α α α α − + − − − − ≡ g 1 s g s 1 A rm
* . Evaluating γ b  at  () m r
* λ  – for any target – we 
have, () () A rm b α λ γ =
* , which equals γ a , evaluated at () m r
* λ  at the target 
*
m r .  These benchmarks, along with 
fact  a γ ( b γ ) is decreasing (increasing) in  m r , are used to establish and characterize an equilibrium.  Our 
characterization also provides insight into the effects of a change in the inflation target under this 
arrangement. 
                                                 
18.  An equilibrium reserve requirement satisfies  λ   < λ < 1.   The second inequality follows from the properties of the  
γ a and γ b curves, described below, and the fact that γ b > 0 at the point (less than 1) where γ a = 0.  
 - 19 - 
Result 7.  Characterizing Equilibria (Reserve Ratio Coordinating Arrangement). 
A.  If  
*
m m r r < , there exist two possible equilibria: 
i)  A lowλ , high growth equilibrium (bond seignorage is positive). 
ii) A highλ , low growth equilibrium (bond seignorage is negative). 
B.  If 
*
m m r r > ,   coordination, if possible, admits two possible equilibria; both either have growth rates less 
than  A α  (bond seignorage is negative in both case) or both have growth rates greater than  A α  (bond 
seignorage is positive in both cases). 
Note it is possible  0 rm <
* , in which case all equilibria are of type 7B. 
We show the three possibilities in Figure 4.  The dashed curves in the figure represent the () γ λ ,  loci 
implied by a γ , b γ  when 
*
m m r r = .  At  () m r
* λ , both are equal to A α , as indicated above.  When 
*
m m r r < , the  a γ  
curve ( b γ  curve) lies to the right (left) of its dashed counterpart (these are shown as the solid curves in 
Figure 4).  As shown in the figure, the economy supports two equilibria – a ‘low’ reserve requirement, high 
growth equilibrium, and a ‘high’ reserve requirement, low growth equilibrium.  The intuition behind these is 
similar to our discussion of the Laffer-relationship for the bond-money ratio θ  in the previous subsection. 
A very similar situation holds when 
*
m m r r > , though in this instance, the two equilibrium growth rates 
are either both high ( A  α γ > ) or both low ( A  α γ < ), as shown in Figure 4.  Moreover, as the case with an 
open market coordinating arrangement, an equilibrium may not exist if the targeted inflation rate is too low. 
-Insert Figure 4- 
5.2 Comparative Statics 
  The effects of a marginal change in the inflation target follows directly from our characterization of the 
equilibria in Result 7.  We have 
Result 8.  The effects of inflation targeting under a reserve requirement arrangement. Regardless of 
whether 
*
m m r r >
< , a marginal decrease in the inflation target will reduce the growth rate and raise the reserve 
requirement for the equilibrium with higher growth and the lower reserve requirement, and increase growth  
and lower the reserve requirement for the equilibrium with lower growth and a higher reserve requirement.  
    -20-
  It is easy to infer the equilibrium effects of an increase in the inflation target on γ  and λ  from Figure 4, 
since an increase in  m r  shifts the  a γ  and  b γ  curves in opposite directions.   
  The direct effect a marginal increase in  m r  on total revenue is  () () [] 0 A 1 A 1 s < − + − − α γ θ θ α θ α λ .  
Note that revenues will fall relatively more in the equilibrium with lower growth and a higher reserve 
requirement. The reduction in revenues can be offset by an increase in the effective inflation tax, γ m r 1− , 
by increasing the growth rate. This occurs in the lower growth equilibrium, and is accomplished by a 
reduction in the reserve requirement. The latter does have the effect of reducing revenues, since it reduces the 
seignorage tax base, but the increase in the effective inflation tax more than offsets the reduction in the base. 
In the higher growth case, the equilibrium effective inflation tax falls. An increase in the reserve requirement 
compensates for the reduction in the tax rate.     
  Unfortunately, the comparative static results of a marginal change in the bond-money ratio θ  on this 
coordinating arrangement are not as easy to portray graphically.  This is due to two reasons.  First, the shift in 
the  b γ  curve for an increase in θ  depends on the inflation target.  Second, an increase in θ  can shift the two 
γ  curves in the same direction. However, definitive analytical results are available, which we present in 
Result 9 below.  
Result 9.  The effects of a marginal increase in θ  on growth under a reserve requirement coordinating 
arrangement.  A marginal increase in the bond-money ratio θ  increases the growth rate for any equilibrium 
with lower growth and a high reserve requirement and lowers the growth rate for the equilibrium with higher 
growth and lower λ .  
  The direct impact of a higher θ  on total revenues is () () γ α α λ A 1 1 s rm − − , which is negative when 
growth is than A α .  The tax base and/or the effective inflation tax rate  γ m r 1−  need to adjust in order to 
satisfy the budget constraint.  In the case of the lower growth equilibrium, this is accomplished by an 
increase in the growth rate (which requires a lower λ , since a higher θ  already has a negative crowding out 
effect on growth).  For the higher growth equilibrium, the inflation tax base increases (λ  increases); this has 
an additional crowding out effect on growth.    -21-
 When  A α γ > , the increase in θ  has a positive direct effect on revenues.  The accompanying decrease in 
revenues is accomplished by a lower λ , which raises the growth rate in the lower growth equilibrium case.  
In the higher growth equilibrium, a decrease in the growth rate lowers the effective inflation tax. It is unclear, 
however, whether the reduction in the growth rate for this case must accompany an increase in the reserve  
ratio λ  – a higher θ , by itself, reduces growth, so the equilibrium λ  can rise or fall with an increase in θ .  
  As in the previous section, one result stands out from the rest. Here, it is possible that an open market 
sale can increase the growth rate, despite the fact that a higher bond-money ratio has the effect of crowding 
out private capital.  As before, this result stems from the accompanying change in the instrument used to 
coordinate the government’s budget constraint.   
6 COMPARING  COORDINATING ARRANGEMENTS 
  The policy triplet () λ θ , , g  defines inflation policy under inflation coordination. Similarly, () λ , , m r g  and 
() θ , , m r g  define open market policy and reserve requirement policy, respectively, under their corresponding 
coordination arrangements.  Since each have the fiscal parameter g in common, we begin this section by 
presenting the comparative static results of the effects of an increase in  g  on the equilibrium obtained for 
each arrangement.  We then provide some general statements comparing the coordinating arrangements.  We 
close this section with a few brief comments regarding welfare.  
6.1 Growth and deficit spending g under alternative coordination arrangements 
Unlike Barro (1990), and more recently, Basu (2001), government spending in the model has no 
productive qualities. Instead, we assume  g  is the usual sort of ‘dumped in the ocean’ spending found 
commonly in macroeconomics.  It may come of some surprise, then, that under each coordinating 
arrangement, an increase in  g  can have a positive effect on growth. 
Where do these results originating, generally?  In each case, it rests on the fiscal constraint and the 
imposition it places on the monetary coordinating instrument.  An increase in the growth rate is one way to 
raise the additional revenue needed to finance higher deficit spending, since higher growth raises the 
effective tax on money and bond seignorages. Under inflation coordination, an increase in the equilibrium   -22-
inflation rate must accompany the increase in government spending.
19  This in turn reduces the real value of 
government borrowing in the bond/rental capital market.  With higher inflation, the price  B P  of new 
government debt issues falls in order to retain the return equality ( )() A P P P 1 1 t t t B α = + ; , as required by the 
assumption that debt and capital are perfect substitutes.  Since the central bank maintains the ratio of bonds 
to money θ , the real value of government debt issues declines, leaving more resources available for capital 
formation.
 20 The growth effect, in this instance, very much depends on the fact that we assume the central 
bank sets the bond-money ratio θ  in terms of its face value, rather than its market value. The higher inflation 
accompanying an increase in g , in effect, reduces the market value of the government=s debt, allowing for 
the increase in growth.    
By contrast, a change in the bond-money ratio θ  under the open market alternative considered in Section 
5 has a direct (positive) impact on the face value of the debt (as well as its market value, since the inflation 
rate is constant under this arrangement).
21 If the inflation tax is large enough and bond seignorage is negative 
(5B above), a marginal increase in  g  can only be financed by reducing θ , the bond-money ratio. A lower θ  
permits greater capital formation and higher growth, which in turn raises the effective money seignorage tax 
rate,  () γ m r 1− . On the other hand, if the deficit is financed by both money and positive bond seignorage, 
(5C and D), the increase in  g  can be financed by relying more on either form of seignorage, which is to say, 
equilibrium  θ  and growth may either rise or fall to achieve coordination.  A similar result holds if 
                                                 
19.  If the inflation rate were to fall, revenues collected through seignorage would be insufficient to fund the additional 
spending. This is due to two features of the model – first, the tax collect on total seignorage, ms + bs would be lower, 
due directly to the lower inflation tax.  Second, the growth rate falls, further reducing revenues. 
 
20. This result holds, if alternatively, government debt is not subject to intermediation.  In this case, the initial impact of 
an increase in g affects the real returns of both intermediated deposits and bonds.  The concomitant increase in the 
inflation rate has a disproportionately (negative) impact on the return on bonds than on deposits since the latter is a 
weighted return on money and capital, and the return on rental capital is unaffected by inflation.  The initial, marginal 
impact of an increase in inflation (lower rm) on the real interest differential between deposits and bonds will equal  –(1-
1/PB) > 0.  Agents will then want to hold deposits instead of bonds, and the bond price must fall in order to restore the 
interest differential to 0, as required for an equilibrium.  The remainder of the story - the impact on the long-run growth 
rate - follows the same logic as we describe above.  
21.  The analysis of an increase in g under an open-market coordinating arrangement is based on the government budget 
constraint/money market clearing relation described in (8) rather than (11), since (11) incorporates the assumption that 
rm = σ  r m
o, which varies with g, as noted in Footnote 16.  The curves for this coordinating arrangement, generated 
without the assumption rm = σ  rm
o share the same properties as those displayed in Figure 3.    
   -23-
coordinating by reserve requirement.  (See the discussion in 6.2 and Table 1 below).  
Result 8 formally states these findings.
 22   
Result 8.  The effect of an increase in g under each coordinating arrangement. 
  A. Inflation coordination: A marginal increase in deficit spending increases growth and inflation. 
  B. Open-market coordination:  
  i .    A marginal increase in g increases growth and lowers θ  in the low-growth equilibrium (5B) and 
in the case where the economy supports a unique high-growth equilibrium (5C).   
  ii.   If the economy supports two equilibra (5D), a marginal increase in g increases growth and 
lowers  θ  for the lower growth equilibrium and lowers growth and increases θ  for the equilibrium with 
higher growth.       
  C. Reserve requirement coordination: A marginal increase in g increases growth and lowers θ  for the 
lower growth equilibrium and lowers growth and increases θ  for the equilibrium with higher growth.    
6.2 Comparing arrangements more generally 
Note the policy parameter g is unique in the sense that it is the only element of the defining triplet – for 
each arrangement – that does not have a direct effect on the excess demand in the capital/bond market.  That 
is, a marginal increase in  g affects directly only the government’s budget (7) (or the  b γ curve).  Any change 
in the growth rate is the result of a change in the coordinating instrument.  This is not the case for a marginal 
change in any other element of the triplets.  Below are some general comments comparing the coordination 
arrangements, based on the comparative static results of the model.                    
An exogenous, marginal change in  m r , θ , orλ  each have two direct effects in model.  First, each has a 
direct, negative effect on growth via the impact on the excess demand in the capital/bond market.  A higher 
value for  m r , like a higher bond-money ratio θ , increases the government’s demand for capital/debt 
resources, directly crowding out private capital.  A higher reserve requirement has a similar negative effect 
on growth (in this case, a higher λ  affects real government debt through its effect on the price level  t P ).  
                                                 
22.  It is easy to see these results graphically. An increase in g shifts the γ b curve upward (regardless of the coordinating 
arrangement) while having no impact on the γ a curve.   
   -24-
Additionally,  λ  has a second, direct effect on excess demand and growth – a higher λ  reduces the amount 
of intermediated saving allocated to the capital/bond market. 
  While each of these variables has, qualitatively, the same general effect in capital/bond market, a much 
different story unfolds as regards their direct impact on government revenues. A higher  m r  always reduces 
total revenues; a higher λ  always increases them. An increase in θ  has a negative direct impact on revenues 
whenever γ α > A , since bond seignorage in this case is negative. The opposite is true when  γ α < A . 
  What role do these two direct effects play in determining the change in the equilibrium values for growth 
and the coordinating instrument?  First, the direct negative effect on growth emerging from the capital/bond 
market has a secondary, negative impact on government revenues, since a lower growth rate lowers the 
effective taxes on money and bonds.  It follows that whenever the direct effect on revenues described above 
is also negative, the coordinating instrument must adjust in a manner that raises government revenues.  When 
the coordinating arrangement supports two equilibria (θ  and λ  coordination), this is accomplished in one of 
two ways: increase the revenue base by increasing the coordinating instrument (which has a reinforcing 
negative impact on growth) or by raising the effective tax rate by raising the growth rate (which is 
accomplished by a lower value for the coordinating instrument).  The former always applies to the 
equilibrium with higher growth, the latter with lower growth. 
  If, on the other hand, the equilibrium is unique and the growth rate is less than  A α , the negative direct 
impact on revenues and growth solicits a change in the coordinating instrument that must be growth-
enhancing. If this were not the case, the change in the coordinating instrument would repress growth further, 
which reduces government revenues.  The two relevant cases – a marginal increase in θ  under inflation 
coordination (where  0 d r d m < θ ) and an increase in the inflation target under an open market arrangement 
where conditions of 4B are met ( 0 r d d m < θ ) – exhibit different overall impacts on the equilibrium growth 
rate.  Evidently, in the former, the positive impact on growth accompanying the increase in the coordinating 
instrument (inflation) is not enough to overcome the negative direct impact higher θ  has on growth, and the 
equilibrium growth rate falls. The opposite is true for the latter case.  
   -25-
  When the change in the exogenous policy variable has a positive direct effect on government revenues, 
as in say, an increase in the reserve requirement under inflation coordination or an open market coordinating 
arrangement when  A α γ > , the change in the coordinating variable can either enhance or inhibit growth.  The 
reasoning is straightforward. In net, the combined effect of the exogenous variable on revenues (the positive 
direct effect on (7) and the negative indirect effect coming from the impact on growth) cannot be determined 
without additional assumptions on the primitives.  The net effect, in turn, plays a critical role in determining 
how the coordinating instrument and growth adjust to restore (7).   
6.3 Welfare  
  As noted in Footnote 4, our assumption of a constant saving rate s  is consistent with a model where 
agents have log-linear preferences and  () β β − = 1 s . Given that returns and the growth rate are constant at 
each date in a stationary equilibrium, the utility of a member of Generation t ,  1 t ≥ , is given by 
() ( ) r 1 t 1 ut ln ln β γ β δ + − + + = , where  () ( ) () () 1 Y 1 1 s s 1 1 ln ln ln β α β α δ + + − + − − ≡  is a constant and 
() A 1 r r m α λ λ − + = is the return on the intermediated deposit. If we assume the government discounts the 
future at the same rate β as agents, the sum of (discounted) utility of all generations, at date 1, aside from the 
current old, is   




i 1 1 1 r 1 u U β γ β β β β δ β − + + − + − = =∑
∞
=
+ ln ln  .      (12) 
  One difficulty in comparing welfare across the coordinating arrangements is the fact that each take, as 
given, a policy parameter that is endogenous to another arrangement.  For example, when trying to assess 
whether U is higher under inflation coordination versus open-market coordination, what parameter value for 
θ  is appropriate for studying the former and what value for  m r  for the latter? (Setting the value of θ  equal 
to the value that obtains under open-market coordination and likewise for  m r  under inflation coordination, 
yields of course, the same value for U  for the two arrangements).   
  Alternatively, one can consider the optimal policy choices for the given parameters for arrangement and 
then look at how welfare varies across arrangements.  This is fairly easy; similar to Freeman’s (1987) result 
for an inflation coordination with capital storage, the best outcome in all cases involves setting the reserve   -26-
requirement to its limiting case ( () α − 1 s g ).
23  By Assumption 2, the deficit can be financed with an 
equilibrium return on money equal to 0. The government simply defaults on any existing nominal obligations 
( 0 M  and  0 B ), as the initial price,  ∞ = 1 P .  The equilibrium growth rate, for this limiting case, 
is () () g 1 s A − − α , and the return on deposits is  () () ( ) α α α − − − 1 s g 1 s A , for each coordinating 
arrangement.  
7 CONCLUSIONS 
Fiscal policy often places constraints on the course of monetary policy.  When such conditions prevail, 
the policies of the fiscal and the monetary branches of government must somehow be coordinated.  This 
paper provides a comprehensive look at this process and its effects on long-run growth under three 
alternative coordinating arrangements.   
The first of these, an inflation-coordinating arrangement, provides insight into the interrelationship that 
arises between inflation and growth in an environment with a dominant fiscal authority.  Our results 
contribute to the literature on monetarist arithmetic by identifying a potentially important channel by which 
coordination is achieved.  Within this section of the paper, we look at how changes in each component of a 
country=s seigniorage policy affects long-run inflation and growth rates.  Both positive and negative 
nonlinear relationships between inflation and growth can be inferred from cross-sectional diagrams generated 
from numerical examples of the model. 
Much less is understood of the other two coordinating arrangements we study. These alternatives provide 
the monetary authority with some degree of autonomy, in the sense it can, perhaps, pursue an inflation 
targeting policy that is seemingly independent of the fiscal constraint.  However, as our results suggest, the 
central bank=s inflation target may not be entirely free of the fiscal constraint, as an overly ambitious target is 
incompatible with an equilibrium as we have envisioned it. 
Missing here is any consideration of nonstationary equilibria.  Most likely, a rich story of the dynamics 
of coordination and growth can be coaxed from our setting, complementing textbook treatments of money 
and government finance in models without endogenous growth (see, for example, Sargent (1987)).  
                                                 
23 .  
−
λ  of Assumption 3 equals this value under the targeting policy rm = 0.    -27-
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 HG  ?
NA  0  ↓  
LR   ↑
HR ↓
LR  ↓  
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Table 1. A summary of the comparative statics for each arrangement.  
 
Key: LG = Low Growth (γ  < αΑ),   HG = High Growth (γ  > α A), HGU = High Growth Unique Equilibrium, HGM = High Growth Multiple Equilibria, LR = Lower Growth Case, 
HR = Higher Growth Case. Lower and higher growth refers to the lower and higher growth equilibrium for the two coordinating arrangements that support multiple equilibria. 
Growth in a lower (higher) growth case need not be less (greater) than  A α .  See Section 4 and 5 for additional details. 
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Notes:  At the point rm = rm;b, γ a(rm) = γ b(rm) = α A for every θ > 0.   
Figure 1. Tighter Money Under Inflation Coordination. Figure 2. Hypothetical Cross-Sectional Diagrams
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2A. A Cross-Sectional Diagram of Inflation and Growth 
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Notes:  The dashed curves represent γ a and γ b evaluated at the target r
*
m . At the point λ
*(r
*
m ),γ a = γ b = α A.   -1-
TECHNICAL APPENDIX 
(Not for Publication) 
  
This appendix contains some technical notes that accompany the main text.  
1. The impact of changes in λ θ , , ,g rm on the γ  curves. 
  Section 3 (Inflation-coordination). 
 i )  ()0 1 s rm a < − − = ∂ ∂ α α λ θ γ  and  0 r
2
m a
2 = ∂ ∂ γ . 




m b > − + − − − + − = ∂ ∂ α θ α α λ α λ θ α λ α γ  and 
  ( ) () () () [] () ( ) [] 0 Ag r A 1 s g 1 s 1 1 s A 2 r
3
m
2 2 2 2 2
m b
2 < − + − − − + − − = ∂ ∂ α θ α α λ α λ θ α λ α γ . 
iii)  ()0 1 s rm a < − − = ∂ ∂ α α λ θ γ . 
iv)  () () ( ) [] () ( ) [] 0 Ag r A 1 s Ag r A 1 s 1 s r A
2
m m m b <
> − + − − − − − = ∂ ∂ α θ α α λ α α α λ α λ α θ γ . 
v)  () ( )0 r A 1 s m a < + − − = ∂ ∂ α θ α α λ γ  . 




b < − + − + − − = ∂ ∂ α θ α α λ θ α α λ γ .  
vii)  0 g a = ∂ ∂ γ . 




b > − + − + − = ∂ ∂ α θ α α λ θ α λ α γ . 
Section 4 (Open-market coordination).   
i)   () () 0 g 1 s A a < − − − = ∂ ∂ α λ σ θ γ  and  0
2
a
2 = ∂ ∂ θ γ . 
ii)  () ( ) 0 1 1 A
2
b >





> + − − = ∂ ∂ θ σ σ σ α θ γ  when  1 <
> σ . 
iii)  () () 0 g 1 s A a < − − − = ∂ ∂ α λ θ σ γ . 
iv)  () ( ). 0 1 1 A
2
b > + + = ∂ ∂ σθ θ α σ γ  
To assess the impact of λ  and g on the γ  curves for an open-market  coordinating arrangement, set σ  = 
o
m m r r in eqs. (10) and (11). The results are the same as shown in v)-viii) for inflation-coordination above. 
 
   -2-
Section 5 (Reserve requirement coordination). 
i)  () ( )0 r A 1 s m a < + − − = ∂ ∂ α θ α α λ γ  and   0
2
a
2 = ∂ ∂ λ γ  




b < − + − + − − = ∂ ∂ α θ α α λ θ α α λ γ  and 







2 > − + − + + − = ∂ ∂ α θ α α λ θ α θ α α λ γ , assuming 
() () [] m r A 1 s Ag Ag θ α α α α λ λ + − ≡ > . 
The impact of a change in  m r , g, and θ  on the γ  curves for a reserve requirement coordination 
arrangement are the same as shown in i) – iv) and vii) and viii) for an inflation coordination arrangement 
above. 
2.  Assumption 1 and its implications for bindingness.    
  In Section 3, we make the assumption that  () () [] 0 1 1 1 s > − + − + θ λ α α  and we claim this assumption is 
sufficient to ensure  A rm α < , as required for a binding equilibrium.   
With no bond financing() 0 = θ , ()( ) ( ) A s 1 1 rm a α λ γ − − = for all 0 rm > , and  () m b r γ  is simply a line 
extending from the origin.  Since  () m a r γ  is everywhere below () () A s 1 1 α λ − − when 0 > θ , financing a 
portion of the government=s deficit with debt issues necessarily results in an equilibrium growth rate less than 
() () A s 1 1 α λ − − .
1  With no bond financing of the deficit, the return on money is  () () [] λ α λ α g s 1 1 A − − − .   
It turns out the function  b γ for  0 = θ , () 0 rm b = θ γ | , intersects the function  () 0 rm b > θ γ |  for any positive 







g 1 s A
r b m;  and growth rate  A α .  (See Figure 2).  At this 
point, of course, bond seignorage equals 0, since the growth rate just matches the real rate of return on 
government debt.  It is easy to verify,  A r b m α < ; . 
If() () A A s 1 1 α α λ > − − , we can find a  0 r a m > ; , with  ( ) A r a m a α γ = ; .  Assumption 1 ensures A r a m α < ; .     
 
                                                 
15.  Note that  () ( ) ( )A s 1 1 0 a α λ γ − − = , and recall,  ()0 rm a < ′ γ .   -3-
3. Comparative Statics  
Section 3 (Inflation-coordination). 
  The rental capital/government debt market can be written as 
   () () () α α λ θ γ λ α − + = − − 1 s r A 1 1 s m           (A-1) 
Totally differentiating (A-1) for  m r   ,   ,   , γ λ θ , we have 
  () () [] () [] () [] λ α α θ α α λ θ θ α α λ γ λ α d 1 s r r d 1 s d 1 s r d d A 1 s m m m − + − + − + = − −  (A-2) 
The government constraint can be written as: 
  () [] () [] [] γ α α θ α λ γ α λ A 1 A r 1 s r 1 1 s g m m − − + − − =        (A-3) 
Totally differentiating (A-3) with respect to  m r   ,   ,   , γ λ θ , and  g  
() [] () [] [] [] () () []
2
m m m m d r 1 s r 1 s d A 1 A r 1 s r 1 1 s dg γ γ θ α λ α λ λ γ α α θ α γ α − + − + − − + − − =  (A-4) 
   () [] [] () [] () [] [] θ γ α α θ α λ γ α λ γ α α θ α λ d A 1 A r 1 s r d 1 s A 1 A 1 s m m − − + − − − − + . 
Effect of a change in θ ο n γ  and rm . 
To solve for the effect of a change in θ  on γ  and  m r , set  0 dg d = = λ  in (A-2) and (A-4) and solve for 
  d d d r d   m θ γ θ ,:    
() () ( ) ()
() () () () γ θ θ α γ θ θ α λ
α γ γ θ α λ
θ − + + + −
− − + − −
=
1 A r 1 1 s A




m m m       (A-5) 
()




− + + + −
− −
=
1 A r 1 1 s A




m         (A-6) 
The denominator in (A-1) (and (A-2)) is positive by the fact that  ()0 rm b > ′ γ  and that   
() ( ) θ θ α γ γ + = <
∞ →
1 A r Lim m b
rm
.  Hence,  , , 0 d d 0 d d < < λ γ θ γ while  0 d r d m <
> θ .  Clearly,  0 d r d m < θ  
when  A α γ ≤ . 
Effect of a change in λ ο n γ  and rm . 
Solving for the effect of a change in λ  on γ  and  m r , we set  0 dg d = = θ  in (A-2) and (A-4):     
        () () ( ) ()( ) ()
() () () () γ θ θ α γ θ θ α λ
γ θ α θ γ α θ α θ α λ
λ − + + + −
+ − + + + + − −
=
1 A r 1 1 s A





m m m m m .     (A-7)   -4-
() ()
() () () () γ θ θ α γ θ θ α λ
γ θ α α
λ
γ
− + + + −
+ − −
=
1 A r 1 1 s A





  .       (A-8)   
Again, the signs of the denominators of the right-hand sides of (A-7) and (A-8) are positive, so 
0 d d < λ γ while  0 d r d m <
> λ . 
Effect of a change in g ο n γ  and rm . 
To solve for the effect of a change in  g  on γ  and  m r , set  0 d d = = θ λ  in (A-2) and (A-4) and solve for 
dg d dg r d    m γ , : 
()() () () () () γ θ θ α γ θ θ α λ α λ
γ θ
− + + + − −
−
=






m .     (A-9) 
() () () () γ θ θ α γ θ θ α λ
γ θ γ
− + + + −
=






.        ( A - 1 0 )  
In this case  0 dg r d m < and 0 dg d > γ . 
Section 4 (Open-market coordination). 
Begin by setting 
o
m m r r = σ in eqs. (10) and (11). 
Effect of a change in rm ο n θ  and γ  . 
To solve for the effect of a change in  m r  on γ  and θ , set  0 dg d = = λ  in (A-2) and (A-4) and solve for 
m m r d d    , r d d γ θ :   
 For  m r d dθ see (A-5). 
   ()
() () ( ) γ α γ θ α λ
α λ γ γ
− + + −
−
=





.        ( A - 1 1 )  
 Since  0 rm a < ∂ ∂ γ and  0 rm b > ∂ ∂ γ , a marginal change in  m r  will shift the curves in Figure 2 in 
opposite directions.  It follows that  0 r d d m < θ for Cases 4B) and 4C), and  0 r d d m > γ for Case 4C). (By 
inspection, (A-11) is positive for  A α γ ≤ , so  0 r d d m > γ  for Case 4B) too).  Using similar logic, 
0 r d d m < θ and  0 r d d m > γ for the lower growth equilibrium and  0 r d d m > θ ,  0 r d d m < γ  for the 
equilibrium with higher growth, in Case 4D).           -5-
Effect of a change in λ ο n θ  and γ  . 
To solve for the effect of a change in λ  on γ  and θ , set  0 dg r d m = =  in (A-2) and (A-4) and solve for 
λ γ λ θ d d    , d d :   
   () ( ) () () ( )
() () ( ) γ α γ θ α λ
γ θ α θ γ α θ θ α α λ
λ
θ
− + + −
+ − + + + + −
− =
A r 1 1 s A





m m m m      (A-12)    
   () ( )
() () ( ) γ α γ θ α λ
α α λ γ
λ
γ
− + + −
− −
− =
A r 1 1 s A




m         ( A - 1 3 )  
 Since  A rm α < ,  λ γ d d  is the opposite sign of  m r d dγ in (A-11).  Hence, for Case 4B) and 4C), we have 
0 d d < λ γ ; for the lower growth equilibrium we have  0 d d < λ γ and the higher growth equilibrium, 
0 d d > λ γ , in Case 4D).  
  The sign of the denominator of (A-12) follows directly from our results for the sign of  λ γ d d  above. 
We can determine the sign of the numerator of (A-12) in the high growth equilibrium of Case 4D). Since the 
numerator of (A-13) is negative and  0 d d > λ γ  for any higher growth equilibrium, we have 
() ()
2
m A r 1 1 s A γ γα θ α λ < + + − . It follows that  
() () () ( ) () ( )A r A 1 r A r A 1 r A 1 1 s r A m m
2
m m m γα θ α θ γ α γ θ α θ γ α θ α λ − + + < − + + + + − . 
But  () ( ) () ( ) 0 r A A r A A r A 1 r A m m m m < + − = − + + θ α α γ α γ α θ α θ γ α , so the numerator of (A-12) is positive 
in this case. Hence, for the higher growth equilibrium in Case 4D),  0 d d < λ θ .  
Effect of a change in g ο n θ  and γ  . 
  To solve for the effect of a change in  g  on γ  and θ , set  0 d r d m = = λ  in (A-2) and (A-4) and solve for 
g d d    g, d d γ θ :   
()() () ( ) [] γ α γ θ α λ α λ
γ α θ
− + + − −
− =






.      (A-14) 
  
() () ( ) γ α γ θ α λ
γ γ
− + + −
=






.        (A-15) 
   -6-
From our work on the effect of a change in  m r  on γ  and θ  above, we know the denominator of (A-14) is 
positive for Case 4B), Case 4C) and the lower growth equilibrium in Case 4D).  Hence, for these cases, 
0 dg d < θ  and  0 dg d > γ . For the higher growth equilibrium in Case 4D),  0 dg d > θ and  0 dg d < γ . 
Section 5 (reserve requirement coordination). 
Effect of a change in rm ο n λ  and γ  . 
To solve for the effect of a change in  m r  on γ  and λ , set  0 dg d = = θ  in (A-2) and (A-4) and solve for 
m m r d d    , r d d γ λ :   
  F o r   m r d dλ , see (A-7). 
  () ()
() () ( ) ()( ) θ α γ θ γ α θ α θ α λ





m r A 1 r A r A 1 1 s Ar
1 1 s A
r d
d
+ − + + + + −
+ −
= .     (A-16)   
 Since  0 rm a < ∂ ∂ γ and  0 rm b > ∂ ∂ γ , a marginal change in  m r  will shift the curves in Figure 3 in 
opposite directions.  It follows that  0 r d d m < λ  and  0 r d d m > γ for the equilibrium with lower growth, and 
0 r d d m > λ  and  0 r d d m < γ  for the equilibrium with higher growth.  
Effect of a change in θ ο n λ  and γ  . 
To solve for the effect of a change in θ  on γ  and λ , set  0 dg r d m = =  in (A-2) and (A-4) and solve for 
θ γ θ λ d d    , d d :   
  F o r   θ λ d d , see (A-12). 
   () ( )




r A 1 r A r A 1 1 s Ar
r A 1 s r A
d
d
θ α γ θ γ α θ α θ α λ
α α γ λ
θ
γ
+ − + + + + −
− −
= .     (A-17) 
  Using the comparative static results for the case for marginal change in  m r  above, we can conclude that 
0 d d > θ γ  for any of the lower growth equilibrium for any of the cases, and  0 d d < θ γ  for any of the 
equilibrium with higher growth.  These follow from the sign of  θ γ d d in (A-16) above, which has the same 
denominator as (A-17).   
  Examining (A-12), we note that the numerator of (A-12) is the negative of denominator of (A-17). 
Hence, the numerator of (A-12) is negative for any of the lower growth equilibrium, and it is positive for any   -7-
of the higher growth equilibrium.  The denominator of (A-12) is clearly positive if  A α γ < , so we can 
concluded that  0 d d < θ λ  for any of the lower growth equilibria with  A α γ < , and  0 d d > θ λ  in any of the 
higher growth equilibria with  A α γ < .   
  Since the numerator of (A-17) is positive and  0 d d > θ γ  for any lower growth equilibrium, we have  
() () ( ) ()( ) m
2
m m m r A 1 r A r A 1 1 s Ar θ α γ θ γ α θ α θ α λ + > + + + + − ,or 
() () () ( )
2
m m m r A 1 r A 1 1 s Ar γ θ α θ γ α θ α λ > + + + + − .  Given this inequality,  
() () ( ) () ( ) () ( ) 0 r A r A A r A 1 r A A A r 1 1 s A m m m m m > + − = + + − > − + + − θ α α γ α θ α θ γ α γ α γ α γ θ α λ .  From 
(A-12), it follows  . 0 d d < θ λ   
Effect of a change in g ο n λ  and γ  . 
To solve for the effect of a change in  g  on γ  and λ , set  0 d r d m = = θ  in (A-2) and (A-4) and solve for 
dg d    g, d d λ λ :   
  








γ θ α θ γ α θ α λ α
γ α λ
+ − + + + − −
− =      (A-18) 
 
   ()









γ θ α θ γ α θ α λ α
γ θ α γ
+ − + + + − −
+
=      (A-19) 
The signs of these derivatives are easy to determine. The sign of (A-19) is the same sign as (A-17).  Given 
our work on  θ γ d d above,  0 dg d > γ  for any of the lower growth equilibrium for any of the cases, and 
0 dg d < γ  for any of the equilibrium with higher growth.   dg dλ shares the opposite sign of  dg dγ .   
  